[VOL. 14: 431 this greater context. Part IV presents a cautiously optimistic view of where the law, meaning not only the Fourth Amendment law but also the statutory law, might be headed.
II. THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE BEFORE JONES

A. Origin and Uncertainties
One can debate precisely which cases fall within the third party doctrine. Indeed, because the doctrine has always been undertheorized by the Court, it is difficult to know what to make of information that is provided to a particular party only in the role of conduit or bailee, and what to make of information that is not actually provided to any one party, but rather that is potentially available to all comers. But the following certainly make the potential list: the "false-friend" cases of 
21
The first thing to notice is that the most recent of these cases is approaching a quarter-century old. Of course, if a doctrine is well settled and well understood, there is no need to relitigate, especially at the Supreme Court. But based on the discussion that follows, this is at least not accurate on the margins, and changed
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After United States v. Jones 435 social norms and technologies might require even an original supporter to reconsider the core. We now live in a world of ubiquitous third party information. Cash is anonymous, at least if not accompanied by closed-circuit television recordings and other records, but many rarely use it. 22 More and more people, and in more and more places, pay in an identified and recorded manner. 23 Offline library and bookstore browsing are practically anonymous, but many have replaced them with online recorded alternatives. 24 The same goes for dictionary and encyclopedia browsing. 25 Over-the-air broadcast television is anonymous, but few use it. 27 What would have been on the hard drive in the home is now stored in the cloud. 28 One could go on and on listing the vast records that are now generated and stored about each of us, and the effects of digital storage and retrieval, but the point is amply made: The increase in third party records is not some minor movement, but rather a tectonic shift. According to Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google, humanity now generates as much information every two days as it did from the dawn of civilization up to the year 2003, 29 and much of that information resides with third parties. Thus, as Paul Ohm has noted, police will do less and less traditional investigation, and more and more requesting of information.
30
Either the Fourth Amendment outside the home becomes a relic dependent upon secrecy, or it adapts to this changed landscape of what affects our security and privacy.
The core of the third party doctrine would seem to be these words of the Miller Court in refusing Fourth Amendment protection for bank records: [T]he relevant inquiry . . . is not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under FAA regulations. Rather, . . . we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
39
What unrelated private persons actually do is a much more limited universe than what they are theoretically able or permitted to do.
B. The Last Twenty-Five Years
Aside from these uncertainties, how has the third party doctrine fared in the last quarter century? Although we have not had a "core" third party case in the Supreme Court for many years, there have certainly been cases which some of the Justices believed to be governed by the doctrine. Interestingly, the doctrine has not fared well.
In . 41 See id. at 342 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If we are to depart from established legal principles, we should not begin here.").
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After United States v. Jones 439 Court held that it was a search, alleging the dubious distinction that "[p]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."
42
The author's Criminal Procedure students year after year would prefer that their overhead luggage be squeezed as opposed to a helicopter being flown over their backyard, not to mention the many other invasions the Court has traditionally allowed under the auspices of the third party doctrine. The holding is, however, consistent with O'Connor's urged limitation: Although the bag is accessible to the public and could be squeezed in this manner, we in fact do not handle each other's bags in this way. 43 The holding is also consistent with a normative limitation in that we should be able to expect more from others in our society, and certainly from police. Either way, it is the product of a more nuanced third party doctrine. 44 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 45 decided in 2001, the question was whether the Fourth Amendment restricted a state hospital from obtaining urine samples of pregnant patients, testing those samples for illegal drugs, and passing on the results to police. Although the dissent urged the false-friend cases of the third party doctrine, 46 the Court focused on why the case did not fit under its "special needs" doctrine that sometimes permits suspicionless drug testing, and remanded the case for a determination of consent.
47
42 Id. at 337. 43 The Bond Court explained as follows:
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus employees may move it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner. [VOL. 14: 431
But under the false-friend cases, there was consent: Undercover agents and moles do not obtain "informed consent" either, and under Miller the doctrine is to apply "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." 48 Hence, while the majority did not wish to admit it, Ferguson is inconsistent with a robust third party doctrine: There appear to be circumstances in which voluntarily conveying information for a third party's use does not vitiate a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Georgia v. Randolph, 54 decided in 2006, the question was whether a cotenant's consent was effective as against a present, objecting cotenant. Although the dissenters urged the assumption of risk of the third party doctrine, 55 a majority held that we must look to the societal expectation, and the expectation is that a party rejected by one cotenant will not enter. 56 There is certainly much
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left to be desired when we get an empirically-based opinion without any empirics, but once again the third party doctrine did not prevail, and in the records context the societal expectation is very often-if not typically-that records shared with another for a limited purpose not be further shared outside of that relationship.
57
The Randolph Court also discussed that one retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in hotel rooms despite the entrance of others, and the same rule applies to apartments and shared office space.
58
In City of Ontario v. Quon, 59 decided in 2010, the question was whether a pager customer retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications residing with the service provider. 60 If we accept a "limited" third party doctrine, this would be answered in the affirmative. 61 Rather than decide that issue, for purposes of the decision the Court unanimously assumed that one does retain such an expectation, 62 and reaffirmed the broad application of the Fourth Amendment: "The Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government, without regard to 57 For example, consider phone records. When it came to light that employees of Hewlett Packard had obtained the phone records of board members in order to investigate alleged information leaks, the backlash cost chairwoman Patricia Dunn her job, resulted in the passage of anti-pretexting legislation at both the state and federal level, a $14.5 million civil settlement, and the filing of both state and federal criminal charges. See 18 U.S.C. § 1039 (2006) Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. 65 Thus, in at least five decisions the Supreme Court has shied away from applying a strong third party doctrine, while also not very clearly articulating an alternative rule. Moreover, as James Dempsey has pointed out, in a 1989 decision the Court rejected a third party doctrine in interpreting a Freedom of Information Act exception.
66 Albeit in a different context, the Court's unanimous rejection of what it considered to be a "cramped notion of personal privacy" is significant. 
C. Other Courts
Lower federal courts should arguably follow the High Court's third party doctrine even if they were to believe the Supreme Court has begun to shift. 68 So, what have lower courts held? Where another right or interest is implicated, they have granted constitutional protection. Thus, at least three district courts have rejected subpoenas or other requests seeking book or movie purchases. 69 As one court sagely noted:
[I]f word were to spread over the Net-and it would-that the FBI and the IRS had demanded and received Amazon's list of customers and their personal purchases, the chilling effect on expressive e-commerce would frost keyboards across America. Fiery rhetoric quickly would follow and the nuances of the subpoena (as actually written and served) would be lost as the cyberdebate roiled itself to a furious boil. One might ask whether this court should concern itself with blogger outrage disproportionate to the government's actual demand of Amazon. The logical answer is yes, it should: well-founded or not, rumors of an id. at 780-81. 68 [VOL. 14: 431
Orwellian federal criminal investigation into the reading habits of Amazon's customers could frighten countless potential customers into canceling planned online book purchases, now and perhaps forever.
70
Courts have similarly granted Fourth Amendment protection to medical records residing with a third party provider.
71
It is not immediately clear whether it is best to approach such cases as First Amendment cases, due process cases, or Fourth Amendment cases informed by those other rights, but there has lately been some scholarly work on how to conceptualize these relationships, 72 and at the very least the cases demonstrate that any third party doctrine is effectively not absolute.
Nor are such decisions limited to where another constitutional right is at stake. Courts have also looked to statutes and the common law in granting Fourth Amendment protections.
73
Although some might object to such a feedback loop in 70 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon. Finally, a few words on state constitutions: Not only do they potentially add constitutional rights to the federal Fourth Amendment floor, but they are themselves relevant in determining that floor. In deciding whether warrantless arrests in public were constitutional, the Supreme Court looked to state practice. 75 In considering warrantless home entry, the Court looked to state practice. 76 Indeed, because the overall numbers were not very persuasive to its conclusion, the Court gave credence to the trend in state practice, 77 as it did to justify its about-face regarding the constitutionality of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. [VOL. 14: 431 developed as we might like, a significant number of states deviate from the Fourth Amendment's third party doctrine.
81
On the precise issue in Jones, namely location tracking, several states took the lead.
82
In 1988, a unanimous Supreme Court of Oregon deviated from the federal beeper cases and held that using a radio transmitter to locate an automobile constitutes a search typically requiring a warrant. 83 In 2003, a unanimous Supreme Court of Washington agreed and required a warrant for GPS tracking under the Washington constitution. 84 In 2009, the New York high court required a warrant for GPS tracking under its state constitution:
The whole of a person's progress through the world, into both public and private spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy periods . . . . Disclosed in the data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment 81 See Stephen E. Henderson 83 Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1049 ("[I]f the state's position in this case is correct, no movement, no location and no conversation in a 'public place' would in any measure be secure from the prying of the government. There would in addition be no ready means for individuals to ascertain when they were being scrutinized and when they were not. That is nothing short of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom."). 84 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 ("[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal about an individual's life. For example, the device can provide a detailed record of travel to doctors' offices, banks, gambling casinos, tanning salons, places of worship, political party meetings, bars, grocery stores, exercise gyms, places where children are dropped off for school, play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant and the fast food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball game, the 'wrong' side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor rally. In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels, and thus can provide a detailed picture of one's life.").
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After United States v. Jones 447 center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on. What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations-political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few-and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits.
85
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has held similarly under its state constitution, though focusing on the intrusion as a seizure rather than a search. 86 Not all states have agreed, 87 but these decisions make a forceful case for constitutionally restricting location surveillance.
So, on the eve of Jones we had a potentially "limited" third party doctrine that might constitutionally protect information provided to a conduit or bailee, that might constitutionally protect information exposed to the public but not regularly obtained by that public, that might constitutionally protect information that enjoys other constitutional or statutory protection, and that might be ripe for change given developments in technology and social norms and trends in state constitutional law.
III. UNITED STATES V. JONES
Police (in particular a joint FBI and District of Columbia Metropolitan Police task force) believed Antoine Jones to be involved in trafficking narcotics. 88 Based on information gathered in a significant investigation, 89 they applied for and received a warrant to install, and then monitor, a GPS tracking device on a Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to Jones's wife. Police thereafter installed just such a device, and remotely monitored the location of that vehicle to within fifty to one hundred feet over a twenty-eightday period. The tracker broadcast the location of the vehicle to a government computer, generating more than two thousand pages [VOL. 14: 431 of location data. Based on this investigation, the Government linked Jones to a stash house containing $850,000 in cash and at least that much value in cocaine and cocaine base.
90
Unfortunately, when police installed the device, they failed to follow the warrant's instructions. They installed it on the eleventh day, when the warrant permitted a ten-day window, and they installed it outside of the District of Columbia. 91 In response to Jones's motion to suppress, the Government argued that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. 92 Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle's location while that vehicle was in any public place: Any member of the public could see the vehicle, and thus so could the police.
It was not difficult for the Court to understand the implications of the Government's theory. At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts inquired whether the Government's position was genuinely that it could, for any reason or no reason, monitor the movements of the Justices for a month without Fourth Amendment restraint. 93 The Government believed it could, 94 and it lost nine to zero. The Court was not unanimous, however, in its reasoning.
A. Scalia Five
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and by Associate Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, held that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy criterion added to, but did not eliminate, the former trespass conception of Fourth Amendment search. 95 In a nutshell, at one time the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was only 90 Id. at 948-49. 91 Id. at 948. The Government did not argue that such failures do not require suppression, a position it might now regret. See id. at 964 n.11 (Alito, J., concurring) (pointing out this lack of argument). 92 Id. at 948 n. 101 Jones thus resurrects the dormant trespass criterion: When police placed the GPS device upon the vehicle, they physically trespassed upon a constitutionally protected area (an "effect") in order to obtain information, and thereby engaged in a Fourth Amendment search. [VOL. 14: 431 theory of trespass to chattel the Court was invoking, and thus we do not know what will suffice in other circumstances. 103 For example, say police lay hands upon a person and ask her a question. We know this likely constitutes a so-called "Terry stop," which is a Fourth Amendment seizure, and we know that such a stop is permissible upon reasonable suspicion.
104
But since this also seems a physical trespass upon a constitutionally protected area (a "person"), and it is for the purpose of obtaining information, is it also a search? Does it matter? How about the examination of the exterior of a vehicle in a parking lot? Purely visual inspection would seem to remain unregulated, but what of taking fingerprints, tire impressions, or paint scrapings? These techniques are probably searches, since they interfere with the property at least as significantly as did the magnetic installation of a GPS device. That is not to say, of course, that they necessarily require a warrant or other judicial preclearance before they are reasonable; the author suspects we will learn the contrary. The point is merely that many new questions now arise.
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The concurrence faults our approach for "present[ing] particularly vexing problems" in cases that do not involve physical contact, such as those that involve the transmission of electronic signals. We entirely fail to understand that point. For unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.
106
The Court's opinion depends upon a trespass rationale, and thus leaves the third party doctrine right where it found it. As an aside, it is interesting to ponder whether Jones might be a first step in the Court jettisoning the reasonable expectation of privacy criterion, and instead using a dictionary-definition of "search" 107 and relying upon the protection against "unreasonable" searches and seizures to do most all of the work. Certainly Justice Scalia would favor this change, as would this author.
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After United States v. Jones 455 freedoms. 130 Like Alito, Sotomayor would consider an empirical conception of reasonable expectation, but one with a normative overlay:
I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. . . . I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment's goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power . . . and [to] prevent a too permeating police surveillance. 131 Finally, Sotomayor directly confronts the third party doctrine:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, as Justice Alito notes, some people may find the "tradeoff" of privacy for convenience "worthwhile," or come to accept this "diminution of privacy" as "inevitable," and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. [VOL. 14: 431
IV. LOOKING FORWARD -A CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
Jones was a major victory for those desiring some restraint on very invasive government surveillance. It is (wonderfully) hard to imagine an America in which Jones comes out the other way, and thus this author was not a bit surprised at the outcome. Until the oral argument, it might have been foolhardy to predict a 9-0 result, but that argument made very clear that the Justices "got it," and in retrospect everyone should have predicted such a result. It is, of course, far too easy to throw around such labels, but there is not much that seems more Orwellian than law enforcement tracking all of our movements without restraint.
But then it seems equally Orwellian for law enforcement to peruse all of our banking records, telecommunications records (other than content of conversations), medical records, media consumption records, and commercial records without restraint. Indeed, in working with different government officials in the course of six years as Reporter for a relevant volume in the American Bar Association ("ABA") Criminal Justice Standards, the author has not met a single one who advocates such law enforcement behavior.
There were, at times, significant disagreements about how best to regulate law enforcement, but nobody seems to advocate carte blanche access. For those who believe the Fourth Amendment should have some role, there is something seriously wrong with a robust third party doctrine.
Hopefully this Article has demonstrated that said "wrong" is not as pervasive in existing law as some might think, because even the existing doctrine has some significant limitations. And there is good cause to be cautiously optimistic about the future. The states have always been our laboratories. They "road tested" the principles that became our Fourth Amendment and the rest of our Constitution, and in recent years they have once again taken up that mantle in the interpretation of their own constitutions. Legislatures have also stepped into the breach, and will continue to do so.
